Th is chapter on operational incidents in East Timor argues that transparent investigations and accountability have been of little importance when the Power element is absent. Its core propositions are: (1) if an operational incident results in harm to those without suffi cient relative power-relative, that is, to those who are causing the harm-then Transparency, Fact-Finding and Accountability are unlikely to occur, and (2) it is also unlikely that there will be repercussions for those causing the harm.
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Th is proposition is encapsulated in a concept articulated by a British diplomatic historian, Mark Curtis. Th e concept is 'unpeople': creatures who look human but are not really human and therefore do not merit elementary human rights.
1 Th e concept is highly relevant to this topic. It wouldn't be fair to take one or two aberrant cases and single them out for special attention. Anyone can fi nd the odd incident where the investigation of an operational incident has been unsatisfactory. To establish the proposition it is necessary to show that it applies to numerous, large-scale incidents occurring over a long period of time. In doing so, I will show that the record on investigations in East Timor conforms with great precision to the maxim of Th ucydides: that "Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suff er what they must." 4 Cranbourne urged Curtin to send troops to Portuguese Timor. Th e Australian contribution, Cranbourne stated, was of "considerable importance." He requested a favourable response "at the earliest possible moment."
5 Curtin cabled back on the same day, saying that the Australian Government had agreed and was authorizing Lieutenant Colonel Bill Leggatt, the Australian commander in West Timor "to send a detachment to act in conjunction with the Dutch" in order "to liquidate the Japanese." Curtin advised that the move "should be made without delay." 6 Th e obvious problem, of course, was that there had not been any Japanese attack against Portuguese Timor (or against the other Portuguese colony of Macau), nor was there any evidence of Japan's intention to attack Portuguese Timor. It was hardly likely that the Governor of Portuguese Timor would be agreeable to the intrusion of Allied troops 
